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Changing Frequencies: The Federal
Communications Commission Globalizes the
Telecommunications Industry with the
Adoption of the WTO Agreement
Krista Schwarting Rose
The United States' statutory restrictions on foreign owner-
ship of telecommunications companies 1 represent an anachro-
nism in today's global market. The 1996 amendments to the
Communications Act of 1934 (the Act) retained § 310(b) of the
Act prohibiting ownership of a media entity by a corporation
that is directly or indirectly controlled by a foreign corporation
or government, or by a corporation that has more than twenty-
five percent of its stock owned by such a corporation or govern-
ment.2 Originally proposed during a time of national insecu-
rity, 3  this restriction is no longer justified in today's
international climate. Indeed, it is now difficult to ignore the
xenophobic fears 4 that prompted Congress to pass § 310. 5
Also, the potential impact that § 310(b) could have on the
global telecommunications market is troubling. Passed at a
time when radio and telephone were the dominant methods of
electronic mass communication, § 310(b) seems especially anom-
alous in an era of digital satellites, wireless cable, and the In-
ternet. Rather than assisting in the liberalization of
telecommunications regulations worldwide, this restriction
makes it difficult for foreigners to invest in the United States
market. As long as these regulations remain, foreign countries
1. See 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1934).
2. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 403(k)(1),
110 Stat. 56, 131-32.
3. The 1934 Act was based on the Radio Act of 1912. Compare 47 U.S.C.
§ 310 (1934), with Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927).
4. See S. REP. No. 73-781 (1934) (referring to the measure as a means of
"insur[ing] the American character" of those holding radio licenses).
5. Senator Clarence Dill, in introducing the committee's report, noted that
§ 310(b)(4)&(5) were necessary to "guard against alien control" and "insure the
American character" of licensees. Id. at 7. He later noted that in a time of war,
the President would simply seize broadcast entities with partial foreign owner-
ship. Id.
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will have little incentive to allow the United States to compete in
their markets.
This Note surveys the evolving interpretations of § 310, ex-
ploring the background of the Communications Act of 1934,
early case law interpretations of it, the impact of multilateral
treaties on telecommunications regulation, and the Effective
Competitive Opportunity (ECO) test. It concludes that the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) logically chose the
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services as the
most feasible and concrete standard by which to judge whether
foreign countries should be permitted to invest in American tele-
communications, as well as whether the investing country pro-
vides roughly equivalent opportunities for American
investment. The FCC believes that the WTO agreement will
minimize the uncertainty as to which countries have agreed to
liberalize their telecommunications industries and have clearly
defined available opportunities. While still granting discretion
to the commissioners, the FCC's use of the WTO agreement con-
stitutes a sound and objective method for evaluating the re-
quirements of §310(b)(4). 6
I. BACKGROUND
A. WHY REGULATE? LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP REGULATIONS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Since foreign ownership restrictions were first enacted in
the Radio Act of 1912, the FCC has adopted a number of ap-
proaches to determine whether foreign ownership is in the pub-
lic's interest. As telecommunications issues have changed and
evolved, these approaches have also changed. First, the 1912
Act attempted to address wartime concerns about sabotage, for-
eign propaganda, and foreign radio interference. 7 Without pre-
scribing a hard-and-fast numerical benchmark, Congress
questioned whether it was permissible to proscribe foreign influ-
ence in domestic communications.8 When the 1912 Act proved
6. While § 310 applies to both traditional and newer broadcast technolo-
gies, this Note considers only the effect that the WTO Agreement will have on
the telecommunications market. Although regulation of both springs from com-
mon precedent, the two differ significantly. See generally Howard A. Shelanski,
The Bending Line Between Conventional "Broadcast" and Wireless "Carriage,"
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1997) (discussing the differences between telecommu-
nications and traditional broadcast technologies).
7. See J. GREGORY SIDAK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS 9-12 (1997).
8. See id.
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inadequate to address the concerns that prompted its enact-
ment, Congress adopted the Radio Act of 1927.9
The 1927 Act contained a numerical benchmark which
capped foreign ownership interests at twenty percent.10 While
the amendments resolved some of the 1912 Act's uncertainty
and addressed the rapid rise of radio communications, the intent
was still to protect national interests and prevent excessive for-
eign involvement in United States communications.11 Congress
also wanted to prevent foreign control of American radio sta-
tions. 12 Congress intended both the 1912 and 1927 Acts to apply
to sea-based and land-based communications. 13 While Congress
was concerned about foreign influence in popular culture con-
veyed over radio airwaves, it was more concerned about mari-
time communications. 14 Congress wanted to ensure that if the
country went to war, there would be an effective method of seiz-
ing stations that had some degree of foreign control or
influence.1i
While § 310 applies to both broadcasting and telephony, sig-
nificant differences prevent them from being treated as the same
medium by the FCC. The fundamental difference stems from
the content/conduit distinction. Broadcasting contains both
components. While it acts as a conduit for communication, it
also has content that the FCC can regulate. 16 Broadcasters use
this conduit as a medium to carry their messages to the public.17
The federal government has recognized that, when necessary, it
can regulate or even seize broadcasting facilities.' 8 In addition,
the FCC imposed content regulations, including the public inter-
9. See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 12, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
10. See id.
11. See SIDAK, supra note 7, at 61-62; Federal Radio Comm'n v. General
Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 466 (1930) (finding that the 1927 Act "was enacted as a
regulation of interstate and foreign radio communication").
12. See SiDAK, supra note 7, at 63.
13. Ironically, Guglielmo Marconi, who received a patent for the radiotele-
graph in 1896, aimed only to create an exclusive system for ships to wire each
other in emergencies. He apparently did not foresee its use as a land-based
communications medium. See id. at 13-14.
14. See id. at 63.
15. See id.
16. One commentator aptly lays out the differences between the two media
and concludes that while the two are distinct, the line between them continues
to bend. See Shelanski, supra note 6, at 1048.
17. See id.
18. See supra note 5 (discussing Senator Dill's statement during Congres-
sional hearings that radio stations with foreign ownership could be seized in
wartime).
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est standard, which required broadcasters to program their sta-
tions for the public's benefit. 19 As broadcasting became an
international industry, the FCC also began to consider questions
of fairness and asked whether foreign governments provided
equal opportunities for American broadcasters to enter into
their markets. 20
The FCC was also worried about the treatment of the grow-
ing number of telephony providers hoping to enter overseas mar-
kets.21 Unlike broadcasting, however, telephony providers do
not use their conduit for communication with the public. 22 In-
stead, they merely provide the conduit for the public's personal
communications. 23 Thus, in applying § 310 to both broadcasters
and telephony providers, the FCC must consider the underlying
policy differences between the two mediums.
Like the two prior Acts, the Telecommunications Act of 1934
reflected fears of inadequate national security, xenophobia, and
the unique American character of United States telecommunica-
tions. While it loosened the 1927 Act's restrictions by allowing
an additional five percent of foreign ownership, it closed a loop-
hole that had allowed American subsidiaries of foreign compa-
nies to invest without applying the twenty percent benchmark. 24
The 1934 Act also appointed the FCC to oversee the Act's appli-
cation, granting it the power to "allocate the spectrum, assign
frequencies, determine the power and location of transmitters,
and award broadcast licenses."25 Although foreign investment
was allowed to increase, the appointment of the FCC indicated
the government's intent to turn communications into a highly
regulated industry. Finally, the 1934 Act added a comprehen-
sive licensing scheme to quell "a widespread fear that in the ab-
19. See Shelanski, supra note 6, at 1055-56.
20. See, e.g., Andrew M. Carlson, Note, The Country Music Television Dis-
pute: An Illustration of the Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protectionism
and American Entertainment Exports, 6 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 585, 588-89
(1997) (describing measures enacted by Canada to exclude American entertain-
ment products).
21. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommu-
nications Market, 12 F.C.C.R. 23891, 23913 (1997) [hereinafter Report on
Reconsideration].
22. See Shelanski, supra note 6, at 1062 (describing the advent of direct
broadcast satellite (DBS) as a method of providing additional common
carriage).
23. But see id. at 1069 (noting that cellular telephony carriers can "place
some of their own content on their systems").
24. See SIDAK, supra note 7, at 64.
25. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STUART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 428 (1985).
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sence of governmental control the public interest might be
subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting
field.",26
Despite the comprehensive nature of the 1934 Act, changes
in the American communications market present new problems
that the Act is incapable of addressing. Technological advances
significantly increased the size of the broadcast spectrum,
27
thereby decreasing the need to regulate based on the scarcity
rationale. 28 The increasingly global economy demands that
America seek out investment opportunities in foreign countries
to remain competitive.29 An increase in foreign investors in the
United States market may also give consumers more choices in
an expanding telecommunications marketplace, allowing them
to determine which services best meet their needs. Finally, for-
eign investors may diversify a media market which has become
more concentrated. 30 To address these differing concerns, the
FCC has adopted a number of tests to measure whether an ap-
plicant meets the foreign ownership regulations. 31
26. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S.
134, 137 (1940).
27. See William B. Garrison, Jr. & Leslie A. Taylor, Wireless Telecom Inno-
vations: New Players, New Structures, New Regulation, 11 COMM. LAw. 26, 30
(1994).
28. See William H. Read & Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform: Governing
Requires a New Standard, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 295 (1997). The scarcity
rationale was one of the reasons Congress chose to regulate the broadcast in-
dustry. See id. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1187 (1997) (finding that the purpose of the statutory
must-carry provisions was Congress' desire to protect consumers from increas-
ing media concentration) (citation omitted).
29. See Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based
Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 112
(1997). The authors noted that "[r]adio waves do not stop at national borders."
Id.
30. See Keith Conrad, Media Mergers: First Step in a New Shift of Anti-
trust Analysis?, 49 FED. Comm. L.J. 675, 677 (1997) (positing that a new study
on media ownership will conclude that less than twenty companies control
American mass media); Steve McClellan, The Big Would Get Bigger with Dereg
Law: Concentration of Ownership is Likely, as Are Rising Prices for Broadcast
Properties in Wake of S. 652, BROAD. & CABLE, June 26, 1995, at 38 (comparing
the United States telecommunications market to Mexico's, where "a few compa-
nies own 100 or more outlets").
31. See Jim Chen, Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunica-
tions Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 836 (1997) (asserting that telecommunica-
tions law undergoes waves of reform and development, "each shaped by
contemporaneous political circumstances and warped by obsolete economic
assumptions").
1999l
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B. FCC STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Telecommunications Act of 1934 created the FCC's
mandate to issue licenses and use other means of regulating
telecommunications to promote "public convenience, interest,
and necessity .... -32 The regulations adopted by the FCC were
intended to further these goals, both by ensuring that licensed
stations have technical broadcast capabilities and mandating
that they promote the "public interest" through their broad-
casts. 33 The FCC determines whether an applicant meets the
public interest standard and decides what to do if adherence is
not perfect.34 An applicant who is denied a license or a peti-
tioner appealing an FCC decision can take their case to federal
court.
3 5
The court will presume that the FCC applied the correct
standard of review and will generally enforce the agency's deci-
sion to deny a license application.36 "[Tihe Administrative Pro-
cedure Act provides that a court may set aside an agency's
32. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1934).
33. See National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217-19 (1943)
(holding that the Commission has the authority to examine not only a station's
technical qualifications, but also its ability to fulfill the public interest crite-
rion). Cf Shaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 88 (1957) (finding
that administrative agencies must evaluate the public interest in accordance
with Congressional mandate).
34. See, e.g., Telemundo Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 802 F.2d
513, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The case involved a transfer of two Puerto Rican
television stations which initially exceeded the alien ownership benchmarks.
See id. at 513. After the applicant corrected the problem to align foreign owner-
ship with the benchmarks, the FCC approved the amended application, even
though it had the discretion to deny it on its initial failure to meet statutory
guidelines. See id. at 515. But see Moving Phones Partnership v. Federal Com-
munications Comm'n, 998 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (involving a cellular
telecommunications lottery in which the winning applicant did not meet the
"letter-perfect" requirement with regard to the foreign ownership benchmark;
the FCC refused to allow Moving Phones to amend the defective application).
While Moving Phones Partnership contended that its application did not violate
§ 310(b)(3) because the statute applied only to alien ownership, not alien part-
ners, the FCC found that to allow alien partners in excess of the statutory lim-
its would create an undesirable loophole in the statute. See id. at 1056-57.
35. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940) (finding that a disappointed applicant has the right to
appeal when the FCC denies a license). Cf. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945) (holding that an applicant
who submits a "bona fide" application has the right to an FCC hearing before a
license can be denied due to exclusivity); Telemundo, 802 F.2d at 514. This
occurred in Telemundo, when an applicant denied a license for not meeting the
foreign ownership benchmarks took the FCC to court for a reconsideration of
the issue. See Telemundo, 802 F.2d at 514.
36. See id. at 518.
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'action, findings, and conclusions' only if it finds them to be 'arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance
with law."' 37
While the FCC's primary task is to determine whether an
applicant meets various statutory requirements, 38 it also has
the power to grant a waiver for an application that does not
facially meet the requirements but nevertheless fulfills the pub-
lic interest standard. 39 The FCC can refuse to enforce alien
ownership restrictions if it deems that the application fulfills a
particular public goal.40 Conversely, the FCC can deny an appli-
cation that facially meets the alien ownership benchmarks if an-
other applicant meets the public interest standard better.
41
The public interest standard is nebulous. As stated earlier,
the FCC determines what constitutes the public's best interest,
and courts rarely question it unless the Commission's decision
seems clearly erroneous. 42
While courts normally defer to the FCC, which it presumes
to have superior and specialized fact-finding abilities, 43 there
are several instances where the FCC has been held to have gone
too far in its rulemaking. 44 While the FCC utilizes an informal
37. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1977)).
38. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192,'203 (1956). The
Court found that the Communications Act of 1934 vested in the FCC the power
to regulate broadcast ownership and concentration in keeping with the public
interest standard. See id.
39. See Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 475 (stating that the Act's purpose is
protecting the public's interest, not protecting an applicant station from
competition).
40. See id. See also United States v. GTE, 48 Fed. Reg. 46634, 46636
(1983), affd and clarified 603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984) (explaining the impor-
tance of a merger which might otherwise violate alien ownership benchmarks);
Seven Hills Television Co., 2 F.C.C.R. 6867, 6890 (1987) (finding that a license
that appears to be in contravention of § 310 should still be renewed because of
the importance of providing programming for Hispanic Americans).
41. See SIDAK, supra note 7, at 130. The public interest standard has un-
dergone a revision with the globalization of telecommunications. These
changes will be further discussed later in this Note. In the context of domestic
broadcasting, the FCC may be able to use the public interest standard as a tie-
breaker between two applicants that otherwise meet the licensing require-
ments. See, e.g., Allentown Broad. Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
222 F.2d 781, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Although the court reversed the FCC's
finding that the two applicants would provide substantially similar service, it
did not state that the Commission could never choose one applicant over an-
other on the basis of superior service to the public. See id. at 787.
42. See Telemundo, 802 F.2d at 518.
43. See id.
44. See Ashbacker, 326 U.S. at 333 (finding that when the FCC granted one
of two competing applications without granting a hearing to the losing appli-
1999]
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rulemaking procedure, courts review its decisions according to
the arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard which
places a stringent burden on the appellant. 45
While recognizing the right to an appeal, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Company held
that the FCC is not required to hold a hearing when an appli-
cant does not meet the criteria for a license and has not set forth
valid reasons why the Commission should grant a waiver.46
While rote use of the Act would result in denial of a license
to an applicant who does not meet the alien ownership criteria,
such a use may not be good policy in an age of telecommunica-
tions deregulation and globalization. Certain mergers that ap-
pear to violate the regulations should not be denied, because
such a denial hampers the ability of the FCC and the Justice
Department to increase competition and make the United States
an active player in the international telecommunications mar-
ket. However, an applicant seeking a waiver of the foreign own-
ership requirements must demonstrate that it deserves a waiver
because it is otherwise beneficial.47 In order for the FCC and
Justice Department to fulfill their goal of increasing global com-
petition and access to foreign markets, they must reconsider the
interpretation of § 310.
cant, proper procedures were not followed and the decision should be set aside);
Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 476 (holding that the FCC denied a hearing to a
losing applicant on improper grounds, while nevertheless upholding the Com-
mission's decision on public interest grounds); Bechtel v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 10 F.3d 875, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (setting aside a proposed FCC
policy preference on the grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious, and
therefore did not warrant the court's deference); Ventura Broad. Co. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 765 F.2d 184, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that
when the FCC departs from previously established policy without sufficient ex-
planation, its decision should be vacated).
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines the level of deference
given to the FCC's, or any other administrative agency's, rulings. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (defining the standards of review for various types of administrative
proceedings); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) (stating that Con-
gress intended the APA to make judicial review "widely available to challenge
the actions of federal administrative officials").
45. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Ins. Co, 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (describing application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard both in reviewing informal rule-making deci-
sions and rescinding or modifying an existing rule).
46. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1956).
47. See id. at 202 (holding that it "might be an abuse of discretion to fail to
hear a request for a waiver which showed, on its face, the existence of circum-
stances making application of the rule inappropriate") (citation omitted).
168 [Vol. 8:161
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The FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act of
1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 should be consis-
tent with the statutes' legislative history, purpose, and intent.
However, interpreting the 1934 Act is hampered because it re-
flects on the xenophobic attitude prevalent between World War I
and World War 11.48 According to the Act's legislative history,
one senator urged that the foreign ownership provisions re-
flected "Americanism," just like the 1927 Act.49 This fear inten-
sified as World War II approached, and it escalated after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor.50 Thus the purpose of the Act may
have been improper. 51 However, the statute survived a 1993
constitutional attack based on its facial classification of appli-
cants by alienage, although the Supreme Court has yet to ad-
dress the issue.52 Using the rational basis standard, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which reviews
FCC decisions, concluded that the national security precautions
more than met the threshold necessary under such a review. 53
Now, with the adoption of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Congress has reaffirmed most of the ownership restric-
tions.54 Thus a new interpretation of the restrictions must be
found that does not take xenophobia into account.
C. CASE LAW INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1934
The first major cases relating to the alien ownership provi-
sions dealt with the scope of the 1934 Act.55 In Noe v. Federal
48. See SIDAK, supra note 7, at 71.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 73.
51. See id.
52. See Moving Phones Partnership v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
998 F.2d 1051, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court typically uses the
rational basis standard for examining classifications based on alienage. Id. (cit-
ing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83 (1976)). See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (stating "that aliens as a class 'are a prime example of
a 'discrete and insular' minority ... and that classifications based on alienage
are 'subject to close judicial scrutiny'") (citation omitted).
53. See Moving Phones, 998 F.2d at 1056.
54. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc., 461 U.S. 574,
600-01 (1983) (stating that Congress' failure to overturn a longstanding inter-
pretation by a government agency can imply that Congress acquiesces in that
interpretation). In amending the Communications Act in 1996, Congress did
not make significant changes to the foreign ownership restrictions, further sup-
porting this implication. See id. at 601.
55. See Noe v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 260 F.2d 739, 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1958) (citing Kansas City Broad. Co., 5 P & F R.R. 1057 (1952)).
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Communications Commission, the FCC considered three appli-
cants for a New Orleans television station, one of which was
Loyola University, a Jesuit institution.5 6 After an FCC exam-
iner awarded the license to Loyola, appellant Noe filed a com-
plaint under § 310 alleging that granting the license to Loyola
would allow undue alien influence over the local airwaves be-
cause the Jesuit order was based in Rome. 57 However, the court
upheld the FCC decision and stated that the Loyola Jesuits, by
virtue of their organizational structure, were sufficiently insu-
lated from any foreign control.58 Specifically, the court found
that "this hierarchical chain of authority . . .has never been
used in the past to impinge upon the independence of the Uni-
versity .... ,,59 The court found that the head of the Jesuit com-
munity at Loyola, while appointed by the Rome-based Superior
General, was an American citizen.60 Indeed, all of the directors
of Loyola's Jesuit order were required to be American citizens.6 1
In upholding the FCC, the court indicated that only a direct and
provable alien influence could justify denial of a license on § 310
grounds. 62
Later FCC rulings, however, supply mixed messages re-
garding what constitutes an unacceptable degree of alien influ-
ence or control. For example, in a Memorandum Opinion and
Order regarding Fox Television Stations' license renewal appli-
cation for its New York City station, the FCC held that the re-
newal was in the public interest despite the fact that the owner
of Fox's parent company was an Australian corporation.63 Fox
Television Stations was owned by Twentieth Holding Corpora-
tions, which in turn was owned by News Corporation Limited.6 4
News Corporation Limited, an Australian company, owned 99%
of the equity capital of Twentieth Holdings Corporation, but
only 24% of its voting stock.6 5 Fox Television Stations assumed
that because News Corporation Limited owned a qualifying
amount of voting stock under § 310, it did not exceed the permis-
56. See Noe, 260 F.2d at 740.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 741.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 740.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 741.
63. See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 10 F.C.C.R. 8452 (1995).
64. See id. at 8454.
65. See id.
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sible degree of alien influence. Despite the existence of a com-
peting applicant for the license, the FCC granted the renewal.66
This result appears to be inconsistent with § 310(b)(4)'s ad-
monition that "any corporation directly or indirectly controlled
by any other corporation of which more than one-fourth of the
capital stock is owned of record or voted by aliens" should not
hold a license, 67 a standard to which the FCC steadfastly ad-
hered in Noe. Although News Corporation Limited did not ex-
ceed the guidelines with regard to voting stock, in Primedia
Broadcasting, the FCC found that it should consider equity in-
terests, in addition to voting interests, in determining whether
an applicant meets the benchmarks set by the 1934 Act.68 In
Primedia, the FCC determined that it would count equity inter-
ests in telecommunications companies or corporations when de-
termining § 310 compliance, regardless of actual voting
interests.6 9 Together, these cases demonstrate the importance
of financial control in determining whether an applicant exceeds
the foreign ownership benchmark.
A related, but distinct, issue with which the FCC struggled
under the original Act was the permissible level of control that
foreign citizens could exert over United States broadcasting en-
tities. For example, when the Seven Hills Television Company
applied for a license renewal for its Phoenix station, the FCC
found that a financial relationship existed between Emilio Az-
carraga Viaurreta (Azcarraga), a Mexican national, and Seven
Hills President Reynold Anselmo. 70 Specifically, the Commis-
sion found that the Azcarraga family lent Anselmo hundreds of
thousands of dollars to invest in other ventures and that a sig-
nificant amount of that money had never been repaid. 71 Other
Seven Hills officials also received money from Azcarraga. 72 An-
selmo, an American citizen, carried programming produced by
Azcarraga-influenced concerns, including an Azcarraga-con-
trolled Mexican company for which Anselmo was also a member
66. See id. at 8495. See Jim Chen, The Last Picture Show (On the Twilight
of Federal Mass Communications Regulation), 80 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1442-44
(1996) (finding that the FCC's previous policy emphasizing local ownership and
control failed "[elven before new avenues for mass communications emerged").
67. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4) (1934).
68. See 3 F.C.C.R. 4293, 4295 (1988).
69. See id. at 4293.
70. See Seven Hills Television Co., 2 F.C.C.R. 6867, 6876 (1987).
71. See id.
72. See id.
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of the board of directors.7 3 An intervener also complained that
Azcarraga had either de facto or de jure control over the
company. 74
Nevertheless, the FCC concluded that Azcarraga did not
have significant control of Seven Hills or the station in ques-
tion.7 5 The Commission found that the loans were inconsequen-
tial because they were not used to finance the purchase of that
particular station.76 Similarly, it determined that de facto con-
trol did not exist because financial leverage no longer factored
into its decision-making process. 77
The FCC considered, but disregarded, the fact that Azcar-
raga and Anselmo had a highly personal relationship. 78 When
Anselmo left Azcarraga's employ the parties continued a rela-
tionship for thirty years prior to the filing of this case. 79 Fur-
thermore, Anselmo and Azcarraga understood that Anselmo
would assist Azcarraga in developing international, and specifi-
cally American, markets for Azcarraga's products.80
The FCC's determination that Azcarraga's influence over
Seven Hills and its subsidiary station should not be considered
defies the logic of § 310 which clearly forbids an excessive degree
of alien influence. 8 ' Nevertheless, the FCC renewed the Phoe-
nix license.82 The FCC noted the importance of providing pro-
gramming to a growing population of Hispanic Americans. 83
73. See id. at 6870. Spanish International Network (SIN) produced most of
the programming in question. See id. Anselmo was the president of SIN, and
owned 25% of the company's stock. See id. Televisa, a corporation based and
headquartered in Mexico, owned the remaining 75% of SIN's voting stock. See
id. While Azcarraga was not a stockholder of SIN, one of his holding compa-
nies, Laura Investment Co., Inc., owned 20% of stock in Spanish International
Communications Corporation, the company which broadcasted SIN's produc-
tions. See id. Azcarraga and his family owned the entirety of Laura Invest-
ment Co. See id.
74. See id. at 6877.
75. See id. at 6878-79.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 6880.
78. After working free-lance in Mexican communications for several years,
Azcarraga hired and mentored Anselmo in one of his own Mexican companies.
See id. at 6869.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 6870-71.
81. See 47 U.S.C. § 310.
82. See Seven Hills, 2 F.C.C.R. at 6891. Cf. Chen, The Last Picture Show,
supra note 66, at 1444 (finding that the FCC's previous policy emphasizing local
ownership and control failed "[elven before new avenues for mass communica-
tions emerged").
83. See Seven Hills, 2 F.C.C.R. at 6890.
[Vol. 8:161
CHANGING FREQUENCIES
However, the Commission ignored the mandate that it intervene
when alien influence is probable.8 4
Seven Hills increased the evidentiary burden of proof placed
on the party opposing the application. The Commission went
beyond the "probable" standard and required absolute certainty
of Azcarraga's direct control.85 One possible rationalization of
this holding is that the license at issue was a renewal, not an
initial grant, and, therefore, the FCC simply rubber-stamped
the application. However, the FCC extensively considered the
matter, and the burden of proof is ostensibly the same for renew-
als and initial applications.8 6
In Univision Holdings, Inc. the FCC denied a hearing to in-
terveners who complained of the same type of managerial con-
trol found in Seven Hills.8 7 While objector Telemundo put forth
significant proof regarding control of voting rights and program-
ming supplied by a foreign minority shareholder, the FCC held
that a hearing was not necessary because Univision met the
alien ownership benchmarks. Furthermore, the petitioners' pre-
diction "that the Buyer will depart from its representations...
[was] based solely on inferences drawn from material on file
with the Commission and is not supported by any additional al-
legations of specific facts."88
Univision left the door open for a petitioner to prevent a re-
newal or sale even if an applicant does not facially exceed the
alien ownership benchmarks.8 9 It quoted language from a Dis-
trict of Columbia case holding that even when statutory require-
ments are met, de facto control can exist in violation of
§ 310(b)(4). 90 Interestingly, had the FCC applied this loophole
in either Seven Hills or Univision, it might have denied licenses
to those companies.
84. See id. at 6876. "[W]here other direct or circumstantial factors animate
that 'potential,' making improper de facto control not merely possible but al-
most probable . . . the Commission can surely act in advance of licensing to
forefend [sic] any transgression of... general 'statutory policy.'" Id. But see id.
at 6875 (stating that the FCC is "in agreement ... that Congress wanted to
guard against actual alien control rather than the mere possibility of alien
control").
85. See id. at 6884.
86. See Univision Holdings, Inc., 7 F.C.C.R. 6672, 6673 (1992).
87. See id. at 6685.
88. Id. at 6674.
89. See id. at 6679.
90. See id. (citing Telemundo, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
802 F.2d 513, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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Recently, FCC and court opinions have shifted away from
questions of content to questions of conduit. These cases present
more complicated problems, as many of them involve not only
the FCC, but also the Justice Department's antitrust division.91
The Justice Department has occasionally supported deals that
appear to bring foreign influence into U.S. business.
For example, in United States v. Western Electric, the Jus-
tice Department supported an agreement between Pacific Tele-
sis (Pactel) and a Japanese carrier, International Digital
Company (IDC), to supply international telecommunications
services originating in Japan and terminating in North
America. 92 The Pactel-IDC agreement allowed Pactel to acquire
less than a ten percent interest in the Japanese provider.93 The
agreement effectively ended longtime provider Kokusai Denshin
Denwa's monopoly on Japan to United States carriage. 94 The
dispute arose when other North American carriers argued that
Pactel should not be able to provide interexchange services un-
less Pactel proved that it would not monopolize that market.95
However, the court and the Justice Department approved the
venture on the ground that "the public interest obviously favors
adherence to a promising trade venture eagerly sought by our
government... [T]he Court has considered not only its language
but also the underlying purposes, and among those purposes the
public interest, particularly as evidenced by congressionally-
mandated policies."96 The court particularly considered the
United States' desire to gain a foothold in the Japanese econ-
omy, especially in the previously monopolized field of
telecommunications.97
91. See, e.g., Michael H. Botein, Cable /Telco Mergers and Acquisitions: An
Antitrust Analysis, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 569, 600-01 (1996) (stating that the cur-
rent policy is to avoid mechanical application of merger guidelines, even when
the result is to increase the size of an already large competitor).
92. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. Civ.A.82-0192, 1989 WL
13378, *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 1989).
93. See id. at *2. Even though this case did not involve § 310, the policy
considerations remain substantially the same.
94. See id. at *1. While IDC originated the calls in Japan, it needed to
subcontract with an American company, namely Pactel, to terminate interna-
tional calls in the U.S. See id.
95. See id. The agreement did not implicate § 310(b)(4), as IDC did not
acquire an interest in Pactel. However, had IDC received an interest similar to
the one it granted Pactel, the statutory benchmarks still would not have been
exceeded.
96. Id. at *3.
97. See id.
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After the Pactel decision, both the courts and the FCC be-
gan to focus on the economic benefits of the application at hand,
rather than numerical benchmarks. This shift in focus became
necessary as the FCC received a large number of applications for
major telecommunications mergers.
D. TESTING INTERPRETATIONS OF § 310: THE NEW
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MEGA-MERGERS
Despite the wealth of case law interpreting § 310, prior con-
structions of the statute do not provide insight on the Act's ap-
plication to the new mega-mergers, which generally involve
combinations of two telephony providers. 98 One of the earliest
mergers occurred in 1983, when GTE wanted to acquire South-
ern Pacific's satellite and telecommunications company.99
Although the merger would have given GTE significant control
over the local telecommunications market, as well as the ability
to enter the long-distance market on an unprecedented scale,
the Justice Department permitted the merger over AT & T's ob-
jections. 100 The Justice Department believed that the merger
would serve the public's interest, so long as GTE took protective
measures to ensure that it did not expand more than the decree
allowed. 101
Since the GTE decree, 10 2 mergers have become significantly
more complicated and are closely reviewed by the FCC and the
Justice Department even when alien ownership restriction is-
sues do not arise.10 3 The Justice Department continues to moni-
tor the anticompetitive aspects of these mergers, while the FCC
examines them for adherence to statutory mandates such as the
foreign ownership provisions. 10 4
98. For purposes of this Note, the term "telecommunications" refers to
global telephony providers.
99. See United States v. GTE, 48 Fed. Reg. 46634 (1983) (Justice Depart-
ment's Proposed Final Judgment and Impact Statement), affd and clarified,
603 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984).
100. See id. at 46636.
101. See id. at 46656, 46662.
102. The parties subsequently called off the deal; however, the decree paved
the way for future telecommunications mergers.
103. See Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1982)). See also Conrad, supra note 30, at 685 (noting that the
Sherman Act is intended to prevent monopoly control over a given market).
104. See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement:
United States v. MCI Communications Corporation and BT Forty-eight Com-
pany ("Newco"), 59 Fed. Reg. 33009, 33016-17 (1994) [hereinafter United States
v. MCI]. See also Merger of MCI Communications Corp. and British Telecom-
munications PLC, 12 F.C.C.R. 15351, 15353-54 (1997) (finding that the appli-
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When examining the proposed merger between MCI and
British Telecom, the Justice Department wanted to ensure that
customers in the countries affected by the merger, specifically
Great Britain, would have access to telecommunications services
without discriminatory treatment based on their choice of pro-
vider.10 5 Ultimately, the Department allowed the merger to pro-
ceed as long as the companies disclosed certain information
about customer access.' 0 6 In addition, the Department required
the information to be released to any competitor interested in
applying for a license for the United States-British International
route. 107
These two mergers represent the beginning of an era
marked by increased consolidation and sales of major telecom-
munications companies. One study of international telecommu-
nications listed three major United States/foreign alliances:
WorldPartners, Concert, and Global One, all of which represent
a significant increase in U.S. access to foreign markets.' 08
AT &T holds the American interest in WorldPartners, MCI and
British Telecom form Concert, and Global One represents a joint
venture among Sprint, Germany's Deutsche Telekom, and
France Telecom. 10 9 Also, WorldCom, a telecommunications con-
glomerate comprised of long-distance carriers, fiber-optic net-
works, and switching facilities, offered to buy MCI in October
1997.110 WorldCom made a bid for MCI to propel itself to the
top of the international telecommunications market."' While
WorldCom had previously acquired a smaller long-distance com-
pany with foreign market penetration, as well as foreign fiber-
cant bears the burden of proving that the proposed merger would neither lessen
competition nor create a monopoly. In addition, the applicant must demon-
strate that the merger will actually enhance competition).
105. See United States v. MCI, supra note 104, at 33017. The Justice De-
partment, while recognizing the importance of seamless global telecommunica-
tions services, also realized that this judgment was only the beginning of the
telecommunications mega-mergers. See id. at 33017-18.
106. See id. at 33018.
107. See id.
108. See John H. Harwood II et al., Competition in International Telecom-
munications Services, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 887 (1997). The authors believe
that increased competition will revitalize the telecommunications marketplace
and better service consumers. Id. at 886.
109. See id. at 887.
110. See Steve Rosenbush & Thor Valdmanis, Global Reach: WorldCom's
$30 Billion Bid for MCI Shows How Much It Wants to Be One of the Giants,
USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 1997, at B1-2.
111. See id. WorldCom completed its merger with MCI on September 14,
1988.
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optic interests, MCI represented a larger share of the foreign tel-
ephone market.112
This wave of mergers raises less concern about foreign influ-
ence than about the impact these mergers will have on consum-
ers and the competitive marketplace. 113 This is especially true
when the market at issue is monopolistic 1 4 or controlled by
government.1 15 In addition, it is uncertain how the Justice De-
partment and the FCC will view such mergers. While they have
celebrated the ability of the United States to enter foreign mar-
kets,' 1 6 these two entities have also taken a hard look at how
such conglomerates will affect competition among telecommuni-
cations providers. 117
The FCC continues to grapple with issues of competition
and public interest when license applications present problems
of foreign-owned or foreign-influenced partners or companies.
Indeed, in 1995 the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing to receive public comments on a new series of policy guide-
lines, the effective competitive opportunity test (ECO test)
112. See id.
113. Some have hypothesized that the mergers will mean neither a better
deal for the consumer, nor a significant increase in the amount of competition in
the telecommunications market. See Robin Knight, Dialing for Dollars Won't
Be Easy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 1996, at 52. Knight, in assessing
the then-proposed and now finalized deal between British Telecom and another
England-based company, Cable & Wireless, suggested that "there have been a
number of cross-border ties but no real takeovers," implying that the merger
has little positive impact for anyone other than the companies involved. Id. See
also Steven V. Brull, Commentary: a Free Phone Market in Japan? Don't Hold
Your Breath, INT. Bus. WK., Mar. 11, 1996, at 18 (finding that while foreign
countries may superficially eliminate red tape when allowing foreign entities to
buy into their telecommunications market, the practical effect of these actions
is minimal); Western Electric, 1989 WL 13378, at *4 (discussing a monumental
merger between the U.S. and Japan and demonstrating the difficulty in crack-
ing a nation's telecommunications industry when it is controlled by the
government).
114. See Veronica M. Ahern, et al., Developments in the International Mar-
ketplace, in 13TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS: POLICY AND
REGULATION, 277 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 427 (1995)).
115. See Harwood et al., supra note 108, at 876 (discussing the prominence
of government-owned foreign telecommunications carriers).
116. See Western Electric, 1989 WL 13378, at *3. The court embraced the
merger because the United States eagerly sought it out, in addition to the per-
ceived enhancement of the public interest by expanding international telecom-
munications service. See id.
117. See Harwood et al., supra note 108, at 889-90. The authors describe the
scrutiny given to the British Telecom/MCI, Global One, and Concert deals. See
id. at 889-91.
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which deals with these situations. 118 The FCC recognized two
important concepts in this Notice. First, it acknowledged that
the telecommunications market has become a global enter-
prise. 119 The FCC stated that the expansion of the global tele-
communications market is a positive development and that
increased competition benefits consumers. 120 Second, the FCC
realized that the current policies and regulations did not ad-
dress all the problems that could potentially arise from this
expansion. 121
The FCC continued to further its goals by applying § 310 in
order to produce results in the public's best interest. 122 It stated
that the 1934 Act provides the best framework for propounding
regulations that serve the public and protect the United States
from foreign influence. 123 The FCC reasoned that § 310
presents legitimate modem concerns.' 24 Specifically, the FCC
found that the public interest would be damaged by "asymmetric
market access," or an imbalance of opportunities between the
United States and the foreign country seeking to enter the
American telecommunications market. 125 With that in mind,
the Commission set three goals for regulating the international
telecommunications market: (1) promote effective competition
in the global market, (2) prevent anticompetitive conduct within
this market, and (3) encourage foreign governments to open
their markets to other countries, namely the United States. 126
The most important aspect of the Notice was the proposal of a
new public interest standard by which the FCC would review
the applications of foreign affiliates hoping to enter the Ameri-
can telecommunications market.
The Global One mega-merger involving Sprint, Deutsche
Telekom, and France Telecom illustrates the new proposal stan-
dard. In its review of the public interest aspects of Sprint's ap-
118. See Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, 10
F.C.C.R. 4844 (1995) [hereinafter Market Entry and Regulation].
119. See id. at 4845, 4853.
120. See id. at 4845. This assertion stands in marked contrast to the Justice
Department's doomsday vision in United States v. MCI, supra note 104, at
33017.
121. See Market Entry & Regulation, supra note 118, at 4854.
122. See id. at 4845. In doing so, it explicitly reaffirmed the purpose of the
1934 Act and carried that purpose forward to apply to the telephony mergers,
finding that national security concerns were still relevant in this new context.
See id. at 4851-52.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 4853-54.
125. See id. at 4854.
126. See id. at 4855.
[Vol. 8:161
CmAAvGING FREQUENCIES
plication, the FCC prospectively applied the new standard,
named the effective competitive opportunity test (ECO test),
which synthesizes the three goals of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. 127 The proposed ten percent ownership by the
French and German monopoly providers, in addition to a corre-
sponding proportion of seats on Sprint's board, exceeded the
twenty-five percent ownership benchmark. Nevertheless, the
FCC approved the merger.128 It did so for two reasons. First,
both France and Germany made specific commitments to liber-
alize their telecommunications markets. Second, the merger
would allow Sprint to upgrade facilities, increase competition,
and provide seamless global coverage, all of which the FCC be-
lieved would benefit consumers. 1
29
II. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 significantly altered
the existing regulations. 130 It did not eliminate the alien owner-
ship requirements altogether. However, it deleted the portion of
§ 310(b) forbidding foreign corporate ownership if "any officer or
more than one-fourth of its officers or directors is an alien.' 3 '
This change renders many of the disputes over § 310(b)(4) moot.
For example, the FCC could no longer scrutinize Rupert Mur-
doch's applications for renewing his television station licenses,
at least not for foreign ownership violations. 132 Similarly, Seven
Hills President Reynold Anselmo would have had fewer
problems with his application under this new legislation. 13 3
However, while the changes are significant, substantial obsta-
cles still exist.
127. See Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 1850, 1855 (1996). See also Harwood et
al., supra note 108, at 889-90 (describing the Global One merger).
128. See Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. at 1860.
129. See id. at 1862-64.
130. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 §403(k)(1).
131. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4), with Telecommunications Act of 1996
§ 403(k)(1).
132. See Fox Television Stations, 10 F.C.C.R. 8452, 8455 (1995) (describing
the difficulties in renewing a license because foreign owners had equitable con-
trol over Fox's parent company). In addition, Murdoch now has American
citizenship.
133. See Seven Hills, 2 F.C.C.R. at 6875. Under the 1996 Act, the FCC
could consider evidence of Azcarraga's financial contributions only as a matter
of public interest, not as a potential violation of the ownership provisions.
When, as here, the applicant facially met the remaining ownership require-
ments and the purchasing corporation itself was not foreign, there would be
little scrutiny under the remainder of 310(b).
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The FCC can continue to examine license applications and
renewals for public interest reasons, and the Justice Depart-
ment may scrutinize them for antitrust violations. Although the
1996 Act significantly deregulated broadcasting, it specifically
retained the public interest consideration as an integral part of
the FCC's evaluation.134 While the Act continues to prohibit
ownership by a foreign government or corporation, the amend-
ment to § 310(b) allows many corporations the freedom to buy
stock in or even merge with American telecommunications enti-
ties. Now, a corporation may buy AT & T stock, for example,
without regard for corporate makeup, so long as the corporation
is founded under American law.
Despite the significant deregulation that took place when
Congress revised § 310(b), there is an anomaly in the Act. While
the restrictions on foreign officers and directors have disap-
peared, the remainder of the foreign ownership regulations have
not. 135 However, the benefit of the revised ownership restric-
tions is clear. Competition will flourish and the quality and
quantity of programming will increase. 136 These benefits may
be tempered, however. The public interest standard may simply
replace the numerical benchmarks. 137 Under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, courts will accept any FCC ruling that com-
plies with Congress' 1996 mandate to deregulate.
134. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(d) (reiterating the public interest standard for tele-
vision stations).
135. See id. Facially, the Act appears to allow most kinds of foreign owner-
ship short of outright purchase by a foreign government or a foreign-incorpo-
rated company. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 403(k)(1).
136. See Margaret L. Tobey & Phuong N. Pham, Broadcast Ownership Pro-
visions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 COMM. LAw. 6, 6 (summer
1996). The authors believe that the FCC, in struggling to balance the goals of
diversity and efficiency, will be able to implement the revised regulations to
benefit consumers. Id.
137. See id. at 8. Tobey and Pham, both communications lawyers, hypothe-
size that the FCC will continue to have the ultimate authority to determine how
the Act's provisions will be implemented. Id. Considering this, it is possible
that the FCC could deny applications or renewals under the public interest
standard, even if they meet the lessened 310(b) restrictions. For example, the
Commission could choose to deny the Seven Hills application as not meeting the
public interest standard if it is undercapitalized or does not originate signifi-
cant programming. As the FCC has traditionally been concerned with its sta-
tions' financial viability, as well as providing a diversity of viewpoints in
broadcasting, it could feasibly deny such an application even though it would
pass muster under the statute's ownership requirements.
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The 1996 Act gives the FCC more latitude than it had under
the amended 1934 Act. 138 Congress's elimination of the numeri-
cal benchmarks allows the FCC to avoid denying an application
just because a corporation has a high number of foreign officers
or directors. 139 The retention of the public interest standard
provides more flexibility for the FCC to approve or deny a li-
cense. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC defined
its existing policy as one that considers "national security, the
extent of alien participation in the parent holding company, and
the nature of the license.' 40 There is no reason why the FCC
should not continue to consider these factors. 141 Unfortunately,
the FCC's balancing of a number of factors often leads to incon-
sistency in defining the public interest. 142 The effect that the
1996 Act will have on these inconsistent rulings is questionable.
The changes that appeared so dramatic may not significantly al-
ter the FCC's practices. 14 3
The Act does not change the underlying foundation of the
alien ownership restrictions. While Congress amended
§ 310(b)(4) in implementing the Telecommunications Act of
1996, the basic provisions of this section continue to stand. The
original § 310(b)(4) read:
[A]ny corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other corpora-
tion of which any officer or more than one-fourth of the directors are
aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned of
record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a foreign govern-
ment or representative thereof, or by any corporation organized under
the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds that the public
interest will be served by refusal or revocation of such a license.
14 4
The 1996 revision eliminated one piece of the foreign ownership
regulations:
[Any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other corpora-
tion of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned of rec-
ord or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a foreign
government or representative thereof, or by any corporation organized
under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds that the
138. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4), with Telecommunications Act of 1996
§ 403(k)(1) (eliminating the restrictions on how many foreign officers and direc-
tors a corporation could have and still meet the benchmark).
139. See id.
140. Market Entry and Regulation, supra note 118, at 4851.
141. See id.
142. See supra notes 63-90 and accompanying text (explaining the mixed
messages embedded in the Fox, Univision, and Seven Hills decisions).
143. See Harwood et al., supra note 108, at 876-77 (suggesting that signifi-
cant changes in telecommunications policy will emerge from enforcement of
GATT, GATS, and NAFTA).
144. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4).
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public interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such a
license. 145
Indeed, one commentator has argued that the rationale behind
the 1927 and 1934 regulations remains intact.146 Others have
suggested that the xenophobia behind the legislation undercuts
the measure's necessity and effectiveness.1 47 Perhaps the most
severe criticism of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is that
the Act may have no competitive or consumer benefits at all.' 48
III. GATT AND GATS
If the Telecommunications Act of 1996 does not have the de-
sired effect, the FCC will have to look for other methods of en-
couraging foreign investment while still preventing excessive
alien influence. 149 Although no method will perfectly advance
the goals of increasing globalization and American access to for-
eign markets, multilateral agreements may provide a basis for
resolving these issues. 5 0
By involving numerous countries in their development, mul-
tilateral treaties enable members to resolve a number of poten-
tial disputes at once. The Uruguay Round agreements set forth
specific objectives for telecommunications, recognizing that the
telecommunications industry had a distinct and important role
145. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(4), amended by Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 131-32.
146. See Rahul Kapoor, Note, Limits on Foreign Ownership of Radio
Licenses Under 47 U.S.C. § 310: An Analysis of the Existing Restrictions and
Proposed Changes in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 Wis. INT'L L.J.
163, 181 (1996). Kapoor argued, prior to the actual passage of the revised 1996
Act, that the national security concerns underlying the original legislation still
existed and needed to be taken into account when determining whether § 310
should be abolished. Id. at 181-82. However, Kapoor also acknowledged that
the restrictions impede globalization of telecommunications technology and
ownership, and they resemble a "protectionist trade measure." Id. at 182.
147. See, e.g., Ian M. Rose, Note, Barring Foreigners from Our Airwaves: an
Anachronistic Pothole on the Global Information Highway, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1188, 1190 (1995). Rose also argued that the restrictions unconstitutionally in-
fringe on broadcasters' First Amendment rights. Id.
148. See Vincent M. Paladini, Note, Foreign Ownership Restrictions Under
§ 310(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 341, 371
(1996) (terming the regulations "inefficient," Paladini claimed that they have
significantly harmed the media and telecommunications industries, and dis-
couraged investment in diverse American programming).
149. See id. at 371-72 (arguing that it is no longer necessary to prevent alien
influence because "the airwaves are no longer susceptible to such misuse").
Therefore, he suggested a repeal of the entire section. Id. at 372.
150. See Harwood et al., supra note 108, at 876-77 (suggesting that treaties
provide the best basis for global telecommunications reform, not Congressional
enactments).
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in the global economy. 151 Accordingly, under both the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)15 2 and the General
Agreement on Trades in Services (GATS) 153 , a general most-fa-
vored-nation treatment applies. In the context of telecommuni-
cations, this means that a member nation must treat all foreign
telecommunications providers equally, as long as the providers
come from another signatory nation.1 54 However, exceptions ex-
ist. Both treaties allow member nations to alter their schedules
to avoid some of the incidents of these articles. 1
5 5
In addition, member nations can undertake specific commit-
ments to one another for particular products or services. Under
GATT, contracting parties create schedules for the import and
export of certain products, although the commitments generally
cannot favor a contracting partner over other member na-
tions.' 56 GATS similarly allows for specific market access com-
mitments that do not violate the most-favoured-nation
requirement of the treaty. 5 7
Both treaties also provide mechanisms to enforce the sched-
uled commitments. Under GATT, if a country believes that it is
not receiving most-favoured-nation treatment or another sched-
uled concession, it must first contact the other contracting party.
It can then negotiate to enforce the obligation. 5 8 Under GATS,
member nations are required to establish tribunals to provide
151. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
152. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
ll, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
153. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Final Act Embodying
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS]. GATS applies to all GATT members.
Id.
154. See GATT art. I(1); GATS art. II(1).
155. See GATT art. I(2)-(4); GATS art. II(2)&(3). Additionally, the GATT
Annex has significant limits on the type of trade activities it covers, and there-
fore will not resolve all the problems created by § 310. For example, GATT does
not cover cable, radio, or television, although radio and television programming
may arguably be considered goods.
156. See GATT art. II(1)(a)&(b).
157. See GATS art. XVI(1). Articles XIX and XX also detail the specific
processes by which member nations should negotiate scheduled commitments.
Article XX, for example, states what the schedule must specify for a given com-
mitment: "terms, limitations, and conditions on market access"; "conditions
and qualifications on national treatment"; "undertakings relating to additional
commitments"; the applicable time frame for the commitment, and the effective
date of the commitment. Id. art. XX(1)(a)-(e).
158. See GATT art. 11(5).
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for a prompt, impartial review and remedy of potential treaty
violations. 1 59 In addition, the Council for Trade in Services can
convene a disciplinary body to deal with unmet requirements or
to determine whether the requirements are fair.
160
Perhaps the most important aspect of the treaties is the
transparency requirement. Nations must share all relevant in-
formation dealing with telecommunications services and net-
works as long as the information is public.16 1 GATT requires
member nations to share all agreements, regulations, and other
information pertinent to international trade policy, and GATS
similarly requires the publication of all information which could
be relevant to any member nation's service providers. 16 2 This
broad-based requirement, which would give member nations an
unprecedented amount of information about the telecommunica-
tions markets of other members, can be avoided by invoking one
of the exceptions. GATT allows exceptions to the generally ap-
plicable terms of the agreement if necessary to protect public
morals, 16 3 human life,' 6 4 or national security and applied on a
nondiscriminatory basis.' 65 Additionally, GATS exempts the re-
lease of any information which would impair a country's law en-
forcement, public policy, 16 6 and security interests. 167
The major drawback to using these treaties to determine
whether or not a foreign country represents a good opportunity
for reciprocal investment is that member nations can specifically
exempt countries, goods, and services from their schedules. If
too many exemptions exist, the treaties essentially become good
ideas that do little to alter countries' monopolistic or prejudicial
practices. GATT allows a contracting party to withdraw or with-
hold concessions from another member under certain circum-
stances 6 8 and sets forth detailed procedures for contracting
159. See GATS art. VI(2).
160. See id. art. VI(4)(a)-(c).
161. See id. art. III.
162. See GATT art. X(1); GATS art. III(1).
163. See GATT art. XX(a).
164. See id. art. XX(b).
165. See id. art. XXI(a)&(b). Specifically, it exempts actions necessary to
protect national security in a time of war. See id. art XXI(b)(iii). These provi-
sions address one of the primary concerns which led to the enactment of the
Communications Act of 1934.
166. See GATS art. IlIbis.
167. See id. art. XIVbis(a)&(b). Like GATT, GATS recognizes wartime as an
emergency condition during which the transparency requirements do not apply.
See id. art. XIVbis(b)(iii).
168. See GATT art. XXVII.
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parties to alter specific scheduled commitments. 169 GATS also
allows a member nation to modify its schedule subject to a time
limit and notification requirements. 170
Both GATT and GATS have similar goals to liberalize tele-
communications restrictions,17 1 assist developing nations, 172
and require disclosure on a previously unimaginable scale.' 73
These treaties contain too many exceptions to effectively balance
foreign ownership restrictions with telecommunications global-
ization.' 7 4 These treaties will by no means resolve either of the
problems of relaxing regulations under § 310 or increasing
globalization in the telecommunications industry.
IV. EFFECTIVE COMPETITIVE OPPORTUNITY
(ECO) TEST
In 1995, the FCC proposed a new rule, the Effective Com-
petitive Opportunity (ECO) test, 75 whereby U.S. telecommuni-
cations providers could enter into an alliance with a foreign
provider so long as the foreign provider's country allowed the
169. See id. art. XXVIII.
170. See GATS art. XXI(1)(a)&(b). A party may only withdraw from a sched-
uled commitment after three years have lapsed since the commitment's effec-
tive date. See id. art. XXI(1)(a). In addition, the withdrawing or modifying
party must notify the Council for Trade in Services no later than three months
before the change is to become effective. See id. art. XXI(1)(b).
171. See GATT preamble; GATS art. XIX(2). GATS specifically seeks to lib-
eralize telecommunications and promote its development in all member nations
with respect to their current and desired levels of development. See GATS art.
XIX(2).
172. See GATT art. XVIII(2). Members are encouraged to help developing
countries raise "the general standard of living of their people." Id. GATS also
encourages developed country members to assist developing country members.
See GATS art. IV(2).
173. See generally supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discussing
the transparency requirements embodied in GATT and GATS).
174. But see Harwood et al., supra note 108, at 877-84. The authors believe
that multilateral approaches such as these represent potential solutions to ac-
cessing foreign telecommunications. Id. They speak in glowing terms of these
agreements, which they believe will "benefit all North American providers of
telecommunications.., services by opening up new markets." Id. at 878. How-
ever, they also concede the possibility that these treaties will have little, if any,
effect as individual countries' commitments differ. Id.
175. This test resembled the "competitive checklist" requirement imposed
on Bell operating companies (BOCs) by the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 271
(1996). To ensure that BOCs meet a number of conditions, namely that the
access and interconnection offered were nondiscriminatory in nature. See id. at
(c)(2)(B)(i)-(xiv).
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United States to compete in its market.17 6 The ECO test pro-
vides more than a numerical benchmark or a nebulous public
interest standard with which to assess a potential alliance. 177
In applying the test, the FCC considers six non-exclusive fac-
tors: (1) Whether the United States had "substantially similar"
opportunities in the country of the foreign applicant; (2)
whether anticompetitive safeguards exist in the foreign country
to prevent discriminatory behavior; (3) whether the foreign
country has transparency requirements; (4) whether the foreign
country would disclose, in a timely fashion, the technical infor-
mation necessary for the United States to take part in that mar-
ket; (5) whether the country protects information about its
telecommunications carriers and customers; and (6) whether
the foreign country has an independent regulatory commission
to oversee the implementation or existence of the other five fac-
tors.1 7 8 No factor is dispositive and all factors are weighed as
the FCC sees fit.1 7 9
The FCC's proposal represented a major breakthrough in
telecommunications reform, and the commission thought the
world telecommunications market would grow in response. i80
With the increasing multinationalization of corporations, the
FCC noted that the United States was increasingly involved in
international telecommunications services.' 8 ' It estimated that
nearly 20% of such services already had ties to United States
providers.' 8 2 The FCC believed that the ECO test might ulti-
mately provide the means to globalization in the telecommunica-
tions industry.183
Like GATT and GATS, the ECO test did not cover some of
the basics of telecommunications, such as radio and televi-
176. See Market Entry and Regulation, supra note 118, at 4853. The FCC
believed that this would not only increase opportunities for U.S. providers
abroad, but would also show a good-faith effort to encourage foreign investment
in American telecommunications, ultimately benefiting the consumer. See id.
at 4853-54.
177. See id. at 4854. The FCC recognized that its prior methods of assessing
foreign ownership created confusion and uncertainty about when a purchase or
application would be approved. See id.
178. See id. at 4859.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 4853.
181. See id.
182. See id. (citation omitted).
183. See Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, 11
F.C.C.R. 3873 (1995) (embodying the final version of the proposed rule) [herein-
after Foreign-Affiliated Entities].
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sion.184 This presented a significant problem because broadcast-
ers continued to be governed by one set of rules, namely § 310(b)
and the public interest test, while the FCC scrutinized long-dis-
tance telephone companies under the ECO test. 85 The FCC
believed that the ECO test would not be the most efficient way
to resolve foreign ownership issues in the radio and television
industries.' 8 6 The Commission also realized the importance of
the public interest test, and concluded that it should be taken
into account along with the ECO test applications.18 7
One possible reason for the disparity is that communica-
tions facilities outside the United States are often owned by for-
eign governments 188 Additionally, many foreign countries fear
they will lose their cultural identity if the United States' mass
media further permeates their communications markets. 8 9 The
ECO test was, however, a good-faith effort by the FCC to resolve
the inconsistencies and anomalous aspects of § 310(b) as it re-
lated to modern telecommunications. 190 The FCC proposed the
ECO test as a means of promoting global competition, prevent-
ing anticompetitive conduct, and encouraging other govern-
ments to open their markets to foreign carriers. 191 These goals
represented an important change by the FCC.
The test also satisfied the Justice Department's goals for in-
ternational markets generally. 192 The Justice Department
wanted to globalize the economy. However, it also wanted to en-
sure that other countries treat Americans fairly and do not take
advantage of the increased leniency in the United States' anti-
184. See Paladini, supra note 148, at 363.
185. See Market Entry and Regulation, supra note 118, at 4854.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 4857.
188. See Harwood et al., supra note 108, at 876 (discussing the prevalence of
government-owned telecommunications entities).
189. Perhaps the best example of a country that fears loss of its cultural
identity is Canada, which employs a substantial legal framework of subsidies
and quotas to encourage production of Canadian-themed and -produced work
and outright prohibitions to prevent importation of certain foreign materials
that compete with the Canadian works. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending
the Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade, National Identity, and Canada's Cul-
tural Preoccupation, 15 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 210 (1998); Carlson,
supra note 20, at 588-89 (describing the measures Canada uses to protect itself
from the prevalence of American culture).
190. See Market Entry and Regulation, supra note 118, at 4855.
191. See id.
192. See Department of Justice, Opening Markets & Protecting Competition
for America's Businesses and Consumers (Apr. 7, 1995) available in 1995 WL
230585 (D.O.J.) [hereinafter OPENING MARKETS & PROTECTING COMPETITION].
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trust policies.193 The Justice Department's protection of United
States telecommunications providers and simultaneous en-
couragment and expectation of equally open markets around the
world, allowed Americans to take advantage of increasing
globalization while hedging their bets against monopoly or gov-
ernment-owned international carriers. 194 Under the ECO test,
the FCC would not approve a foreign transaction taking place in
the United States unless the other country provided similar op-
portunities for American carriers. 195 The Justice Department
also hoped that the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI), a nonprofit institution that develops European
telecommunications standards, would aid the FCC in developing
policies to decrease unreasonable demands placed on foreign
companies trying to enter any country's telecommunications
system. 196
The best and worst aspects of the ECO test are identical.
The test did not bring consistency to the FCC's rulings on
whether a deal meets or exceeds the alien ownership guidelines.
The Commission did not specify which factors it would consider
dispositive in determining whether a country had liberal tele-
communications markets. 197 In fact, the FCC stated that it
would assess each country on a case-by-case basis. 198
Not all commentators agree that the ECO standard was am-
biguous. 199 Despite differences of opinion regarding the clarity
193. See id. at *2.
194. See Harwood et al., supra note 108, at 885.
195. See id. Another problem that arose was what constituted similar op-
portunities. See id.
196. See OPENING MARKETS AND PROTECTING COMPETITION, supra note 193,
at *5. The Department wanted to increase innovation in telecommunications
on an international level while simultaneously breaking down barriers to for-
eign investment. See id. See also Milda K. Hedblom & William B. Garrison,
Jr., An Uncertain Sound: The European Union's Plan for the Information Soci-
ety, 12 COMM. LAw. 15, 16 (1995) (describing the European Union's desire to
become more competitive in the global communications marketplace). Accord
Today's News, Broadcast Autonomy and Responsibility are Goals of European
Commission, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 12, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12298876
(stating the Commission's goal as breaking down anticompetitive barriers in
telecommunications, such as government monopolies).
197. See Market Entry and Regulation, supra note 118, at 4853. The FCC
did not specify what constituted a "liberal" market, or how equivalent opportu-
nities must be in order to make the carrier's entry into the United States
acceptable.
198. See id. at 4854.
199. See Kapoor, supra note 146, at 175 (finding the new standard clear and
predictable). Kapoor believed this regulation would prevent "discriminatory
and exclusionary behavior" and encourage competitive opportunities. Id. at
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of the test, it did represent a step forward in globalizing the tele-
communications market.200 The FCC, while decrying the uncer-
tainty caused by applying a combination of numerical
benchmarks and the public interest standard, proposed the test
as a definite determination. 20 1 The test remained somewhat
ambiguous, as the factors had to be examined on a case-by-case
basis and could result in multiple outcomes. The FCC continued
to be able to deny a license, renewal application, or multina-
tional merger under the ECO test. It could condition its re-
sponse on the country involved, whether the country's
government or private sector owned or controlled its telecommu-
nications industry, or based on the country's level of trans-
parency. Under this standard, the FCC had flexibility and its
decisions would be granted judicial deference unless they were
clearly arbitrary or capricious. 20 2
This standard, in combination with the public interest as-
sessment, was intended to provide greater economic and compet-
itive benefits to American telecommunications owners. 20 3
However, it did not concretely resolve one of the major problems
of modern-day § 310 application: how to determine whether an-
other country offers reciprocal opportunities to United States
companies to provide telecommunications services. Without the
ability to determine whether a country will give equivalent ac-
cess to the United States, it is impossible for the FCC to decide
whether granting a license to a partially foreign-owned or for-
eign-influenced company is in the public interest.
V. THE NEXT FRONTIER: THE WTO AGREEMENT
The ECO test was short-lived. Early in 1997, the FCC de-
termined that the World Trade Organization Agreement on Ba-
sic Telecommunications Services (WTO Agreement) would
supplant the ECO test as the standard by which to judge appli-
175. But see Ahern et al., supra note 114, at 289 (explaining that the FCC had
difficulty in applying the equivalency standard, especially in making determi-
nations for several foreign countries with pending applications).
200. See Paladini, supra note 148, at 365. Paladini argued that the FCC's
realistic approach and superior fact-finding ability made this proposal worka-
ble, despite the individual nature of the determinations. Id.
201. See id. (explaining why it adopted the test).
202. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n of United States v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983).
203. See Knight, supra note 113, at 52. The world telecommunications mar-
ket will likely prove to be a very lucrative industry; estimates as to its worth
range as high as $900 billion by the year 2005. See id.
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cations that exceed § 310(b)(4) requirements. 20 4 The United
States completed negotiations for the WTO Agreement in Febru-
ary 1997 and adopted this proposal in November 1997.
The WTO Agreement became effective on February 5,
1998.205 In the fall of 1997, the FCC declined to apply the WTO
standards prospectively, as it had previously done.20 6 In
Telecom Finland,20 7 decided just prior to the final adoption of
the WTO Agreement, the Commission continued to apply the
ECO test 20 8 despite the commitments the Finnish government
had made to the WTO. 209
A. FCC ADOPTION OF THE WTO AGREEMENT
The FCC partially discontinued the use of the ECO test
when it discovered that the WTO Agreement was the best
method for determining whether reciprocal competitive opportu-
nities exist in foreign markets. 210 In adopting the WTO Agree-
ment, the FCC created a presumption in favor of allowing a
foreign country to participate in the United States market. 211
The Commission found that this presumption served the public
interest because it would facilitate opening foreign markets to
United States providers while increasing global competition. 212
The presumption, however, is rebuttable and only applies to
telecommunications carriers from WTO member countries. 213
The presumption allows member countries' carriers to escape
204. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommu-
nications Market, 12 F.C.C.R. 7847, 7849-50 (1997) [hereinafter Policies on For-
eign Participation]. The Commissioners had previously stated that if the
Executive Branch succeeded in negotiating a bilateral or multilateral telecom-
munications trade agreement "under the auspices of the World Trade Organiza-
tion . . . we would gladly amend the rules we adopt today as necessary."
Foreign-Affiliated Entities, supra note 183, at 3964-65.
205. See FCC electronic press release, Entry into Force of WTO Telecom
Agreement, (Jan. 26, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/Daily-Releases/business/1998/
db980127/nrin8001.txt>.
See also Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 1850, 1862 (1996). The European Union
announced January 1, 1998 as the date by which it hoped to see full market
liberalization implemented. See id.
206. See id. at 1855-56 (finding that it "is well established that the Commis-
sion may apply new rules and policies to pending matters").
207. See 12 FC.C.R. 17648 (1997).
208. See id. at 17652-53.
209. See id. at 17656.
210. See Report on Reconsideration, supra note 21, at 23913.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. The FCC anticipated that only rarely would anyone attempt to
rebut the presumption. See id.
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scrutiny under §310(b)(4) unless an intervener offers a rebut-
tal.2 14 The Commission justified the presumption on grounds of
administrative efficiency. It believed that if it could establish
that the carrier is from a WTO member country, it would be un-
necessary to make further inquiries into the opportunities in
that country's telecommunications market.215
However, the FCC reserved the right to deny a license to a
carrier from a WTO member country if it found that the carrier
posed the risk of exercising excessive market power and discrim-
ination against other countries' carriers. 216 The Commission
also reserved the right to deny a license to an applicant who had
previously violated FCC rules, U.S. anti-competition rules, or
criminal laws.21 7 In addition, if the Commission found that the
carrier discriminated in the United States market and harmed
American companies competing abroad, it could deny a li-
cense. 218 In most circumstances, the FCC believed that its own
safeguards could effectively prevent a foreign carrier from estab-
lishing that kind of control.21 9
Although the FCC believed that this approach would en-
courage competition and promote administrative efficiency by
expeditiously granting licenses to any applicant that fell within
the presumption, it refused to adopt a position which would
have allowed any foreign carrier to compete in the United States
without restrictions. 220 This would have gone beyond the safe-
guards provided by the WTO Agreement. 221 Harking back to
the genesis of the 1934 Act, the FCC maintained that it could
consider whether an applicant poses national security risks.222
In close cases involving questions of foreign trade or policy, the
214. See id.
215. See id. "[W]e find that adopting a rebuttable presumption in favor of
entry will allow the Commission to grant the vast majority of applications
swiftly, while maintaining the oversight necessary to ensure that entry by an
applicant from a WTO Member is consistent with the public interest." Id.
216. See id. at 23914.
217. See id. at 23915. It believed that an applicant who had been found
guilty of such violations would not further the goals of competition. See id.
218. See Report on Reconsideration, supra note 21, at 23915.
219. See id. at 23913-14.
220. See id. at 23915-16.
221. See id. The Commission found that it would be deprived of ensuring
that the foreign carrier met the public interest standard if it adopted the un-
restricted entry approach. See id.
222. See id. at 23919. However, the FBI expressed strong opposition to the
FCC's new approach due to national security problems posed by foreign owner-
ship of common carrier licenses. See id. at 23938. The Commission believed the
FBI was overstating its concerns. See id.
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FCC stated that it would also consider the opinions and con-
cerns of Executive Branch agencies. 223
Even if an applicant carrier from a WTO member country
exceeds the twenty-five percent foreign ownership benchmark,
the FCC streamlines the application process. 224 While such ap-
plications must receive the Commission's approval, they will not
be subjected to the stringent public interest analysis as long as
an obvious national security concern is not raised and the appli-
cation appears to increase competition. 225 An applicant's na-
tionality, for purposes of the WTO Agreement, is determined by
the carrier's principal place of business or home market.226
If an applicant does not come from a WTO member country,
however, the FCC continues to apply the ECO test.2 27 The FCC
determined that while WTO Agreement safeguards prevent an-
ticompetitive behavior by member countries, there is no such as-
surance with non-members. 228 In addition, it argued, WTO
members are bound by GATS obligations and generally believed
in liberalization of trade laws and the importance of competi-
tion.229 Because no such assurances exist for non-member coun-
tries' applicants, the FCC reasoned that the ECO test should
still apply.230
Despite its belief that member countries would not engage
in anticompetitive behavior, the FCC employs a number of safe-
guards, including some that are not contained in the WTO
Agreement. For example, the FCC will closely scrutinize an ap-
plicant that is a dominant carrier in its home country and there-
fore has the ability to discriminate against other carriers. 231
223. See id. at 23919-21. The FCC reiterated its intention to remain in-
dependent of the Executive Branch, even while considering their concerns. See
id. at 23921. Because it expected such Executive Branch concerns to arise very
rarely, it did not expect executive interference to present a major problem. See
id. at 23919-20.
224. See id. at 23940-41.
225. See id. at 23941.
226. See id. at 23941-42. If the Executive Branch believed an applicant was
willfully misrepresenting its home country, it could urge the FCC to adopt a
different test on a case-by-case basis. See id.
227. See id. at 23943.
228. See Report on Reconsideration, supra note 21, at 23944.
229. See id. at 23945.
230. See id. at 23945-46. As such, the FCC would still have to investigate
whether the applicant's country provided equivalent opportunities for United
States providers. See id.
231. See id. at 23959. The Commission adopted a presumption that if the
applicant had less than a fifty percent market share in its home country, then it
did not have the ability to leverage market power. See id. at 23959-60.
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Such carriers are subject to reporting requirements, 232 quar-
terly revenue and traffic reports,233 and quarterly maintenance
reports.234 The Commission also retained the "no special con-
cessions" rule from the Notice on Proposed Rulemaking, which
forbids United States international carriers from accepting spe-
cial concessions offered by a foreign carrier. Such an arrange-
ment could eventually lead to excessive control in the American
telecommunications market.235
Although the Commission contemplated additional safe-
guards to prevent anticompetitive behavior by any carrier, not
just non-member country applicants or dominant providers,23 6 it
found that additional safeguards were unnecessary because a
number of applicable remedies were already available. 237 These
remedies include revoking licenses, requiring a United States
carrier to terminate its relationship with a foreign affiliate, and
changing the structure of U.S.-foreign alliances in order to pre-
vent anticompetitive conduct. 238
The FCC also embraced the GATS requirements and safe-
guards that apply to all WTO members, especially the most-
favoured-nation principle,239 transparency requirements, 240 and
market access for all basic telecommunications services. 241
Although it believed that these measures were largely adequate
to protect carriers and consumers, the FCC defended its 1995
addition of the no special concessions rule as consistent with the
spirit of GATS. Finally, the availability of GATS dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms reassured the FCC that it did not need to
adopt additional safeguards suggested by interveners. 242
232. See id. at 23955.
233. See id. at 23993-94. These provisions are similar to the transparency
requirements of GATT and GATS.
234. See id. at 24013. These reports would require the carrier to provide the
FCC with information about the amount of usage and the amount charged for
different types of uses. See id.
235. See id. at 24015-16.
236. See Report on Reconsideration, supra note 21, at 24022.
237. See id. at 24023.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 24036-37.
240. See id. at 24037.
241. See id. at 24040.
242. See id. at 24050.
1999]
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
B. FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE WTO AGREEMENT TO THE
LICENSING PROCESS
It remains to be seen how effective the WTO Agreement will
be in assisting the Commission's decision-making. Although the
commissioners that proposed the adoption of the WTO Agree-
ment believed that it provides the best standard, the Commis-
sion has since experienced a high degree of turnover.243 In
1997, all the Commissioners except Susan Ness retired or were
not reappointed by President Clinton.244 This turnover may ex-
plain the hesitancy to prospectively apply the WTO Agreement
standard in October 1997.245 In addition, it is uncertain how
much the new Commission supports the previous Commission's
determination that the WTO Agreement provides the best basis
for ruling on foreign ownership benchmarks and public interest
considerations. Ness, however, participated and concurred in
the rulemaking that ended in this determination. 246
Of the four new commissioners, only William Kennard has
spoken publicly on the use of the WTO Agreement.247 He sup-
ports it, claiming that "we [the FCC commissioners] expect to
see a widespread shift away from the monopoly provision of tele-
communications... services and toward competition, open mar-
kets and transparent regulation."248 The other commissioners
have had little opportunity to make any statements regarding
the new standard, but it is probable that they also support the
measure. Harold Furchgott-Roth, the former chief economist for
the House Commerce Committee, is expected to support meas-
ures which increase the United States' role in the international
telecommunications market, which the WTO Agreement would
243. Of the current Commissioners, only Susan Ness served on the Commis-
sion that adopted Policies on Foreign Participation.
244. See Federal Communications Commission Home Page (visited Sept. 9,
1998) <http://www.fcc.gov> (listing biographies of the five current FCC Com-
missioners: Chair William Kennard, Gloria Tristani, Michael Powell, Harold
Furchgott-Roth, and holdover Susan Ness).
245. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (explaining the current
FCC's reluctance to prospectively apply this new standard in Telecom Finland).
246. Policies on Foreign Participation, supra note 204, at 7849. Ness did not
issue a separate statement or dissent; therefore, it may be assumed that she
supported the decision.
247. FCC electronic press release, Statement of FCC Chairman William E.
Kennard, Re: Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecom-
munications Market, (Nov. 25, 1997) <http://www.fcc.gov/speeches/kennard/
statements/stwek705.html>.
248. Id.
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potentially accomplish. 2 49 Michael Powell, previously Chief of
Staff of the Justice Department's antitrust division, publicly fa-
vors increased deregulation and competition, which could also
indicate a favorable impression of the WTO Agreement. 250 Fi-
nally, former New Mexico public utilities commissioner Gloria
Tristani remains uncommitted, cautiously approaching upcom-
ing FCC issues, including foreign ownership.
2 5 1
If at least four of the five current commissioners support the
WTO standard for foreign ownership, the Agreement may pro-
vide the best method yet for assessing competitive opportunities
and public interest.2 52 It contains the best elements of the mul-
tilateral treaties, numerous commitments 25 3 and transparency
requirements, and the goals of the ECO test.254 In addition, the
WTO Agreement eases the FCC's burden in determining which
governments are actually allowing United States providers to
compete. 2 5 5 Because countries have made scheduled, specific
commitments to the WTO, it is significantly less difficult to de-
termine whether a market is competitive.
Thus, the schedules and WTO regulations provide a clear
standard by which the FCC can determine whether foreign own-
ership is in the public interest, as well as whether the reciprocal
market allows a sufficient degree of competition. It avoids the
ambiguity of the ECO test, while giving the FCC enough flexibil-
249. Today's News, FCC Nominees Criticize Telecom Act Implementation,
COMM. DAILY, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13779410.
250. Chris McConnell, Michael Powell: a General Impression, 127 BROAD. &
CABLE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 12.
251. Today's News, Tristani Says She Will "Study Up" Before Deciding Is-
sues, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13780799.
252. See Policies on Foreign Participation, supra note 204, at 240 (finding
that the WTO agreement's "successful conclusion would benefit U.S. consumers
and carriers by increasing opportunities for end-to-end competition in the provi-
sion of basic telecommunications services, thereby leading to lower prices and
greater choice and innovation").
253. At the time of adoption, 55 schedules representing 69 member govern-
ments had been submitted and accepted, including many former telecommuni-
cations monopolies. See Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 1850, 1857 (1996) (indicating
that the FCC considered monopoly providers France and Germany's public com-
mitments to the WTO essential to the decision that the Sprint merger could
proceed). Signatories included the United States and the European Union, as
well as a number of developing countries.
254. See Policies on Foreign Participation, supra note 204, at 7849. The
Commission believed the WTO agreement would fulfill the goals of increased
competition and market entry, which were also covered by the ECO test. See
id.
255. See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (setting forth the FCC's
presumption toward granting the license applications filed WTO member coun-
tries' telecommunications providers).
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ity to determine whether a given transaction benefits United
States consumers. Combining the formal structure of GATT and
GATS with the ECO's market analysis, the WTO agreement ap-
pears to take the best of both formats while avoiding most of
their pitfalls. 25 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The global telecommunications market represents a prime
opportunity for the United States to expand its own industry
while allowing other countries to present a diversity of view-
points to Americans. Short of Congress repealing § 310, the
FCC has considered a number of methods by which to determine
whether a foreign individual or company should be allowed to
invest in American telecommunications, as such investments
are limited by 47 U.S.C. § 310.
The FCC recently settled on the WTO Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications Services as the standard by which to judge
an application involving foreign investment. The Agreement
provides concrete assessments of how open the applicant's home
country is to United States investment, as well as safeguards
that ensure that the foreign applicant does not act in an an-
ticompetitive manner. The Agreement represents the best op-
tion for globalizing the telecommunications industry in the
twenty-first century.
256. But see notes 163-73 and accompanying text (explaining that both
GATT and GATS member nations can choose not to schedule commitments that
they deem competitively undesirable). While the WTO agreement generally
provides that members should not discriminate against each other through the
most favored nation principle. However, nine members scheduled exemptions
from the most favored nation principle, including the United States.
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